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Abstract— Recently, Hwang et al. introduced a knapsack 
type public-key cryptosystem. They proposed a new algorithm 
called permutation combination algorithm. By exploiting this 
algorithm, they attempt to increase the density of knapsack to 
avoid the low-density attack. 
We show that this cryptosystem is not secure, as it based on 
basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem and because of 
the superincreasing structure, we can use shamir's attack on 
the basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack to break this 
cryptosystem. 
 
Keywords— Public-key cryptosystem, Knapsack problem, 
Shamir’s attack, Cryptanalysis.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
N 1976, Diffie and Hellman [3] introduced the notion of the 
public-key cryptography. Until that time, most public-key 
cryptosystems (PKC) fall into one of the two below categories 
[1]: 
• Public-key cryptosystems based on hard number-
theoretic problems: e.g., RSA [13], ElGamal [4] and …. 
• Public-key cryptosystems based on subset sum or 
subset product problems: e.g., Merkle-Hellman [9], 
Chor-Rivest [1], Morri-Kasahara [11], Naccache-Stern 
[12],… .  
Unlike hard number-theoretic problems, the knapsack 
problem has been proven to be NP-complete [10]. That is, 
there is no polynomial algorithm will be invented to solve the 
knapsack problem. 
Since its Merkle-Hellman proposal, knapsack PKCs had 
been widely studied, and many knapsack-based PKCs were 
developed. There is no question that knapsack PKCs still 
warrant continuous researches, as a result of the NP-
completeness nature, the faster speed and a desire to have a 
wide variety of available cryptosystems. Nowadays, 
researchers reconsider knapsack public-key cryptography also 
because Shor [15] showed that integer factorization and 
discrete logarithm problems can be easily solved by using 
quantum computers. Therefore, traditional PKC schemes 
based on the two problems cannot be used to provide privacy 
                                                        
 
protections any longer, and PKC schemes secure in quantum 
computing environment are needed to be developed. Although 
the underlying problem is NP-complete, but almost all 
knapsack cryptosystems were shown insecure in that they are 
vulnerable to some known attacks such as: low density attack 
[2,6], Shamir’s attack [14] and diophantine approximation 
attack [17]. This vulnerability is due to the special structure of 
the private key and the mathematical methods that public key 
(public knapsack) was built from the private key.  
In this paper, we analyze security of the Hwang et al. 
cryptosystem [5]. We show that due to similarity of the key 
generation algorithm of their scheme with the basic Merkel-
Hellman cryptosystem, we can use Shamir’s attack to obtain 
equivalent private keys.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we briefly explain subset sum problem and the basic 
Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. Then, in Section 3, we review 
the Shamir’s attack. Hwang et al.’s knapsack cryptosystem 
will be presented in Section 4 and cryptanalysis of this system 
will be given in Section 5.  
II. THE SUBSET SUM PROBLEM AND THE BASIC MERKLE-
HELLMAN CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The subset sum problem is stated as follows: given a set of 
positive integers (, . . . , ) and positive integer . Whether 
there is a subset of the 	s that sums to . This is equivalent to 
determine whether there are variables (
, . . . , 
) such that 
 
 =		 
	 	, 
		0, 1, 1 ≤  ≤ 	. 
 
If the set of positive integers (, . . . , ) be a superincreasing 
sequence, e.g. 	 > ∑  ,	 		 ≥ 2, then the knapsack 
problem is solvable in polynomial time.  
The basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem uses a 
superincreasing sequence as a private key. This cryptosystem 
is as follows: 
Key generation. The designer chooses a superincreasing 
sequence (, . . . , ) and two large positive integers  and , 
such that 
  > ∑ 		        ,      gcd(, ) = 1  . 
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He also selects a permutation # of 1, 2, . . . ,  and then 
transforms the easily solved knapsack $ into trapdoor 
knapsack (, . . . , ) via the relation 
 
                           	 = 	. %(	)	mod	.                            (1) 
 
The public key is (, . . . , ) and the private key is (, (, . . . , ),), *, #. 
 
Encryption. To encrypt message + = (+, … ,+), he 
computes 
 
- =	+		 , 
 
and sends it to the receiver. 
Decryption: To recover plaintext + from ciphertext -, the 
receiver should perform the following steps. 
1) Compute 
 . = -	mod	. 
 
2) With  his private key, (, . . . , ),	solve a superincreasing 
subset sum problem and find integers (/, . . . , /),/		0, 1 such that 
 
. =.	/		 	+0.		. 
 
       Note that since  > ∑ 		  hence . = ∑ .	/		 . 
3) The message bits are 
 +	 = /%(	)	,  = 1, 2, … , . 
III. SHAMIR ATTACK ON BASIC MERKLE-HELLMAN 
KNAPSACK CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In 1982, Adi Shamir [14] shows that modular multiplication 
cannot perfectly hide the superincreasing sequence (private 
key), and hence, all the equation of the form 
  
- =
			 	,			
	 ∈ 0,1, 
 
can be solved in polynomial time. This approach originates 
with Shamir [14] although we follow the presentation of 
Lagarias [7]. 
Such as Hwang et al.’s knapsack cryptosystem [5], we 
assume that no permutation is used. Hence equation (1) can be 
written as follows: 	 = 	. 	 	mod	. 
 
Let 2 = 	mod	 where 1 ≤ 2 < . We have 
 
	 = 2	 		mod	. 
 
This means that for 1 ≤  ≤ , there exists some integers 4	 	such that 	2 − 4	 = 	 
 
and 0 ≤ 4	 < 	 . Hence, 
 
                     0 ≤ 2/ − 4	/	 = 	/	.                        (2) 
 
Since the 	s are superincreasing we have 	 < /2	 and so 
 0 ≤ 2/ − 4	/	 < 1/	2	. 
 
In particular, the right side of  2/ − 4/ < 1/(2) is 
very small. Hence we can assume 2/ ≈ 4/. 
We now observe that to break the basic Merkle-Hellman 
knapsack it is sufficient to find any pair (2′, ′) of positive 
integers such that 2′	 	mod	′ is a superincreasing sequence 
(or similar enough to a superincreasing sequence that one can 
solve the subset sum problem). We show that if 4/ is close 
enough to 2/, then (2′, ′) = (4, ). 
Subtracting the case  = 1 of equation (2) from the -th 
gives 
 4 − 4		 = 		 −  = 	 − 		  
 
and so, for 2	 ≤ 		 ≤ 	, 
     
 
|	4 − 4	| = |:;<=:=<;|> < (><=> = 2	 < >(?@=@;.       (3) 
 
Taking ′ =  and 2′ = 4 then 2′	 	mod	′ is very close to 
a superincreasing sequence. 
Since  is public, It remains to compute the integer 4 such 
that equation (3) holds, given only the integers , . . . ,  . 
Another way to write equation (3) is 
 A	 − 4	4A = 42	, 
 
and one sees that the problem is precisely simultaneous 
diophantine approximation. We can use lattice based reduction 
algorithm for solving simultaneous diophantine 
approximation. Performing lattice basis reduction one obtains 
a guess for 4.    We now set 2B = 4 and ′ =  and 
computes 2′	 	mod	′ for 2 ≤  ≤ . This is a 
superincreasing sequence. We then compute 2′-		mod	′ for 
any challenge ciphertext - that is decrypted using the 
superincreasing sequence, and therefore message is recovered. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF HWANG ET AL.’S CRYPTOSYSTEM 
Hwang’s cryptosystem is based on the Merkle-Hellman 
cryptosystem. In the key generation stage, each user chooses a 
superincreasing sequence $ = ,…	 , CDE as secret key. 
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i.e. 
	 >	 				( = 1, 2, … , 1360). 
 ) and )′ are secret modular multipliers such that 
 gcd(*,)) = 1,     * > ∑ 	CDE	    and     )×) B =1		+0.	*. 
 
Each user transfers superincreasing sequence                      $ =	 	, …	 , CDE into a pseudorandom sequence I	 =	, …	 , CDE as follows: 
 
         	 	= 	 	 	.)	mod	*		,			(1 ≤  ≤ 1360).                  (4) 
 
Further, each user chooses a random 170× 256 binary matrix 
H, a vector J = (/ , … , /(KD)L and a vector MJ =(ℎ/ , … , ℎ/OE)L  to satisfy the following equation: 
 M. J = MJ	+0.	 
 
 
P ℎ, ⋯ ℎ,(KD⋮ ⋱ ⋮ℎOE, ⋯ ℎOE,(KDT .U
/⋮/(KDV = P
WX;WXY⋮ℎ/OET 	+0.		 
 
                                                        = Z ([(;⋮(;\]^ 	+0.	  
 
ℎ/	 = 2	 =ℎ	,/(KD 	+0.				( = 1, 2,… , 170). 
 
Let H(. ) be a one-way hash function. 
The public key is (I, J) and the private key is (M,$,),) B, *). 
They present a permutation algorithm and want this 
algorithm to ensure the security of the cryptosystem. The 
permutation algorithm is as follows: 
 
1) Define an original sequence 
 aE = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b(, b. 
 
2) Recombine all the elements of the original sequence aE 
which obtain (! 	− 	1) sequences a, . . . , a(!). The 
sequences a	( = 1, 2, … , ! − 1) are defined as follows: 
 aE = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b(, b a = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b, b(	 a( = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, b(, bC, b	 aC = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, b(, b, bC	 ac = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, b, bC, b( 	aK = b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, b, b(, bC	 ⋮ 
a! = b, b(, bCbc, … , b(, b, b	 
 
3) Suppose we can compute ae for 1 ≤ + ≤ ! − 1. + can 
be written as  
+ =f	( − )!	 , 0 ≤ f	 ≤  −  
        
each sequence has an own corresponding value called the 
factorial carry value f, f, … . , f(, f. Using the 
factorial carry value, we can efficiently obtain any 
sequence. Let + = 6 and we want determine the sequence aD. We can write                                     6 = 0 × ( − 1)! + ⋯+ 1 × 3! + 0 × 2! + 0 × 1! + 0 
      So the factorials carry value of aD is: f, f, … . , f(, f = 0, 0,… , 0, 1, 0, 0, 0 
4) With the knowledge of the original sequence b , b, b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b(, b and the factorial 
carry value 0,0,0, . . , 0,1,0,0,0 of aD , we can compute 
sequence aD as follows: 
 
       Get b by introducing f = 0. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are b, b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b(, b. 
       Get b by introducing f = 0. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are b(, … , bK, bc, bC, b(, b. 
           ⋮	
       Get bK by introducing fK = 0. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are bc, bC, b(, b. 
       Get bC by introducing fc =1. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are bc, b(, b. 
       Get bc by introducing fC = 0. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are b(, b. 
       Get b( by introducing f( = 0. Here, the remaining 
elements in the sequence are b. 
       Get b by introducing f = 0. 
Therefore, the sequence aD is: 
 b , b, b(, … , bK, bC, bc, b(, b. 
 
Encryption: The sender A executes the following steps to 
generate the ciphertext i of the message j.  
 
1) Compute the digest a of j as 
                  a = ME(c(j). 
2) Compute  aB = a	+0.	170!  
3) Compute the factorial carry value 2 = k, k(, … , kOE 
of a′ where 
 
             aB = k × 169! + k( × 168! +⋯+ kOE × 0! 
 
4) Divide B’s public key vector I< = <, <( 	, …	 , <CDE 
into 8 subset public key vectors. Each subset public key 
vector has 170 elements. 
 
                    I< 	= (<, <( 	, …	 , <OE),  
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(<O, <O(	, …	 , <CcE), ⋮ 
                                
(<n, <n(	, …	, <CDE). 
 
5) Recombine each subset public key vector using           2 = k, k(, … , kOE by means of the Permutation 
Combination Algorithm. I chooses each subset public 
key vector in the first 128 elements. Then, I will obtain 
1024 elements	I<o = k< , k<(, … , k<E(c . 
6) j is divided into j,j(,… ,j. Each                jp	(4 = 1, 2,… , q) is a 1024-bit message. 
 jp = 
p,, … , 
p,E(c 
 
7) The corresponding ciphertext ip is given as the product of I<o and jp (4 = 1, 2, … , q). 
 
ip =  k<	E(c	 × 
p,	 
 
The ciphertext is i = i, . . . , i. I sends (i,aB) to $ 
through the insecure channel. 
 
Decryption: After receiving i and a′, $ executes the 
following steps to derive j from (i,aB): 
 
1) Compute the factorial carry value 2 = k, k(, … , kOE 
of a′ where 
 aB = k × 169! + k( × 168! +⋯ , kOE × 0 
 
2) Divide his secret key vector $< = <, <(, … , <CDE 
into 8 subset public key vectors. 
 
                     $< =	 (<, <(	, …	 , <OE), (<O, <O(	,…	 , <CcE), (<Cc, <Cc(	,…	 , <KE), (<K, <K(	,…	 , <DrE), ⋮ 
            
(<n, <n(	, …	 , <CDE). 
 
3) Recombine each subset public key vector using           2 = k, k(, … , kOE by means of the Permutation 
Combination Algorithm. B chooses each subset public 
key vector in the first 128 elements. Then, $ will obtain 
1024 elements $<o = k<, k<(, … , k<E(c. However $<o = k<, k<(, … , k<E(c is still a superincreasing 
sequence. 
4) Divide i into i = i, . . . , i. Each ip	(4 = 1, 2,… , q) is 
a 1024-bit ciphertext. 
 
5) Compute the recombine message j/sp, which is given as 
the product of ip and ) B	(4 = 1, 2,… , q). 
 
                  j/sp = ip ×) B	mod	* 
                            = ∑ (k<	E(c	 × 
p,	) ×) B	mod	* 
                   = ∑ (k<	E(c	 ×) × 
p,	) ×) B	mod	* 
                   = ∑ k<	E(c	 × 
p,	 	mod	* 
 
So the receiver solves this superincreasing knapsack problem 
and then obtains the message j. 
Obviously, there is no difference between the cryptosystem 
above and the original Merkle-Hellman except the omission of 
the permutation # in the key generation stage. 
V. ATTACKING THE CRYPTOSYSTEM 
As we mentioned in section IV, Hwang et al. suppose that 
superincreasing sequence $ = ,…	 , CDE is private key 
and produce public key from equation (4): 
 	 = 	 .)	mod	*,						1 ≤  ≤ 1360. 
 
Let 2 = )	mod	*. We have 
  	 = 	 . 2	mod	*	, 1 ≤  ≤ 1360 
 
We can solve simultaneous diophantine approximation, as 
described in section III, and find a pair of integers (2′, *′) 
such that 2B/*′ is close to 2/*. With this pairs, we can now 
compute integers 
 ′	 = 	 . 2Bmod	*B,				1 ≤  ≤ 1360 
 
which form a superincreasing sequence. This sequence can 
then be used in place of to secret key vector                       $ = (,… , CDE). 
On the other hand, we can eavesdrop pair (aB, i) from 
insecure channel and hence we can compute factorial carry 
value 2 = k, k(, … , kOE of a′ where 
 aB = k × 169! + k( × 168! + ⋯+ kOE × 0! 
 
We divide recovered pseudo secret key vector 	$′ = ′,… , ′CDE into 8 subset public key vectors: 
 
                $′ =	 (′, ′(, … , ′OE), 
                            
(′O, ′(,… , ′CcE), 
                                         ⋮ 
                            
(′n, ′(,… , ′CDE) 
 
and recombine each subset public key vector using  2 =k, k(, … , kOE by means of the permutation combination 
algorithm. We choose each subset public key vector in the first 
128 elements. Then, we will obtain 1024 elements $′o =′k, ′k(, … , ′kE(c.  
Divide i into i = i, . . . , i and with computed pair (2 ′, *′) we can compute: 
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          j/sp = ip × 2 ′	mod	*′  
                     = ∑ (k	E(c	 × 
p,	)2 ′	mod	*′ 
                     = ∑ (′k	E(c	 × 
p,	)		mod	*′  
Note that k	 × 2 ′mod	*′ = ′k	. 
Since ′k, ′k(, … , ′kE(c is a superincreasing 
sequence, we can solve this easy knapsack problem for 1 ≤ 4 ≤ q and therefore we can obtain the message           j = j,j(,… ,j. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 We considered a new knapsack-based PKC scheme. This 
scheme uses a permutation algorithm in the encryption phase 
to avoid the low density attack by keeping the density high. As 
we showed, this scheme is vulnerable, since like original 
Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem uses a superincreasing 
sequence as private key and attempt to hide this sequence with 
modular multiplication. But as Shamir showed, the modular 
multiplication cannot perfectly hide the superincreasing 
sequence. To avoid this attack, we can choose another easy 
knapsack problem, for example, like this presented in [18] or 
we do not use modular multiplication to produce the public 
key.  
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